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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper addresses the somewhat paradoxical situation whereby on the one hand, 
the concept of a “Europe of the Regions” has largely been discredited and has 
generally fallen out of favour, whilst at the same time, the level of regional 
engagement in Europe continues to grow at an exponential rate. Regions themselves 
continue to operate actively in Europe. The number of offices in Brussels representing 
regional authorities from member states has grown exponentially over the past twenty 
years (Jeffery, 1997; Bomberg and Peterson, 1998; Heichlinger, 1999; Moore, 2006a). 
Regions from the new member states have been racing to set up representative 
bureaux in Brussels and thus to get ahead of ‘the competition’ or at least, be in the 
game. Beyond this, the older and more established regional representations are 
expanding their capacity in Brussels by deploying more resources, hiring more staff 
and moving to larger, better-located premises in the city (Moore, 2006b). 
 
The question this paper seeks to answer is how we can best explain this paradox. Why 
should the ‘Europe of the Regions’ be such a marginal idea when there is clear 
evidence to support a stronger and increasingly mobilised regional level establishing 
itself at the heart of the decision-making centre in Brussels? What contribution does a 
regional presence in Brussels make to territorial politics? How is regional engagement 
in EU affairs manifesting itself and what are the implications for the future of regional 
Europe? These core questions underpin the reflections presented in this paper.  
 
In seeking to address this paradox, the paper is structured into three sections. The first 
section considers the institutional dimension of regional engagement in Brussels, 
arguing that the presence of a regional grouping around the EU decision-makers 
contributes substantially to regional interest mediation. The permanence of this 
engagement can be regarded as the institutionalisation of a regional voice in Brussels. 
The second section then addresses the scope and extent of that regional voice, 
examining the core measures by which we can identify an increasing presence for 
regional actors within the EU. It considers the ‘value added’ of this regional grouping 
both to the EU decision-makers and to key actors within the home regions. The third 
section of the paper then focuses on the fact that a number of different clusters of 
regional actors are emerging within the Brussels arena today. Analysis of divergent 
roles and strategies provides further explanation for the declining salience of the 
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different types of regional actors. 
 
FROM MOBILISATION TO INSTITUTIONALISATION: EXPLAINING THE 
PERMANENT PRESENCE OF REGIONS IN BRUSSELS  
 
The simple explanatory factor in understanding regional engagement in Brussels is 
that EU policy matters for regional actors. On the one hand, most EU legislation 
involves local and regional governments in its implementation, and has thus 
engendered a set of active regional players seeking to shape that legislation 
(Greenwood, 2003: 231). In addition, estimates suggest that around 60-80 per cent of 
legislation passed by regional legislatures itself originates from the EU (Scottish 
Parliament, 2002a; NIA, 2002), and this figure is growing. On the other hand, the 
progressive decentralisation in the majority of member states in recent years has 
increased the capacity of regional actors to hold national governments to account over 
policy preferences and their support for EU aims (Loughlin, 2001: 18).   
 
The relevance of EU policy and legislation for regional actors offers one explanation 
as to why they ‘mobilise’ in Brussels. Evidence of ‘sub-national mobilisation’ 
(Hooghe, 1995) can be seen in many different guises, such as the creation of cross-
border regions, trans-national associations of regional actors or European federations 
of local government associations and such like. The emergence of regional 
representations has only ever constituted one element within a wider process of 
mobilisation, and the multiplication of channels for regional interest mediation in the 
EU since the mid-1980s when the mobilisation phenomenon began (Bomberg and 
Peterson, 1998; Keating and Hooghe, 2001). Nonetheless, representations in Brussels 
provide an independent profile for regional actors, and are the most visible form of 
this new regional dynamic. 
 
Alternative interpretations of the growing regional presence in the EU have sought to 
establish cultural, ethno-political motivations underpinning the mobilisation of 
regions. Language, cultural practice and party political support at the regional level 
which is at variance from that dominant in the national political arena have variously 
been seen as potential motivational factors driving regional engagement with EU 
institutions (Marks et al., 1996; Keating and Hooghe, 2001; Marks et al., 2002). On 
the surface at least, regional representations in Brussels, situated alongside those of 
national governments, offered the potential for such regions to “outflank” national 
positions (Marks, 1992: 218; Benz, 1998: 117), or to “mobilise Commission support 
against their own national governments” (Ansell, Parsons and Darden, 1997: 350).  
 
However, a number of developments have undermined these approaches. Firstly, 
there is now blanket coverage of regional representations from all member states, 
irrespective of ethno-political concerns. This fault line has not emerged as a salient 
political force in the mobilisation agenda. Secondly, regional representations have not 
emerged as a significant means of “bypassing” national governments in pursuit of 
regionalist aims. Despite initial tensions, no member state government has been 
moved to legislate against regional representations; indeed, these now tend to view 
them rather as partners to whom some of their own tasks – notably the provision of 
information to universities, small businesses and such like – can be hived off (Börzel, 
2002: 77). Empirical evidence therefore suggests that regional actors are concerned 
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than using representation as a means to champion domestic political and 
constitutional change. 
 
Since the first representative office was established in 1984, the level of regional 
engagement in Brussels through the form of an independent representation has grown 
exponentially. 
 
Figure 1: Number of regional offices in Brussels, 1984 – 2007
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Figure 1 illustrates the extent to which the maintenance of a regional presence in 
Brussels has become the norm. In fact, those regions which do not have some form of 
individual office are the exception, and tend largely be those regions in the new 
member states which have not yet managed to secure either funding or personnel to 
do so. 
 
This pattern of representation illustrates the extent to which a regional presence in 
Brussels has become a core element of EU membership. A modern EU region is one 
which is actively engaged in Brussels networks through some form of representative 
office. Regional administrations in the new member states are keenly aware of the 
significance of regions as part of the overall political currency in Brussels, and of the 
weight of precedent set by the model of engagement set by former EU15 regions. “It 
would be strange if we weren’t there”, the comment of one Polish regional official, 
illustrates the extent to which this model has permeated administrative thinking in the 
new member states on the appropriate forms of engagement with the EU. On the basis 
                                                 
1 This graph illustrates figures noted in the following sources: Marks et al., 1996; Jeffery, 1997b: 183; 
Badiello, 1998: 322; Greenwood, 2003: 243; Committee of the Regions, 2004, 2007. 
 
  3of a form of “lesson-drawing model” (Schimmelpfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004), the 
practice of representing regional interests in the EU through a permanent office in 
Brussels has been imported into the action plan of regional administrations across the 
new member states. 
 
In the light of this overwhelming empirical evidence, it can be said that the model of a 
regional representative office has been institutionalised within patterns of interest 
mediation in Brussels. If we understand the concept of an ‘institution’ as capturing a 
set of rules, norms and understandings (March and Olsen, 1989: 21), then it is clear 
that emergent practices of policy initiation and development in the EU sphere draw on 
the weight of regional expertise situated in and around the key institutions. 
Relationships are structured on the basis of appropriate modes of interaction (Peters, 
1999: 28); regional representatives offer a perspective on policy implementation, for 
instance, that can improve future policy design. Regional actors also have the weight 
of democratic legitimacy at the sub-national level to support their policy preferences, 
a factor which facilitates their engagement in a number of policy networks (Moore, 
2006a). On areas such as competition law or financial services regulation, for 
instance, they have a more marginal contribution to make. Nonetheless, there is a 
general expectation on the part of the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, the Permanent Representations of the member states and indeed, other 
regional actors, that any given region will be represented and can be accessed through 
some form of permanent Brussels base. To this extent, the form of engagement of a 
regional-level representation in the European Union, has become institutionalised; all 
actors involved are investing resources which facilitate a continuing relationship 
(Mazey and Richardson, 2001: 78).  
 
THE REGIONS IN EUROPE: THE SCOPE OF REGIONAL 
REPRESENTATION IN THE EU 
 
The paradox of regional engagement in the EU today is that despite the decline of the 
“Europe of the Regions” agenda, regional activity in the Brussels arena continues to 
strengthen. On any measure, it is clear that the regional presence in Brussels is 
swelling; not only has the number of regional offices grown at an exponential rate 
(see Figure 1, above), but those representations themselves continue to expand, 
employing more staff and moving to more prestigious, visible and strategically 
positioned locations (Table 1). Two of the German Länder representations recently 
moved into larger premises, closer to the European institutions, whilst at the same 
time increasing their staffing numbers by around one third. The Welsh Assembly 
Government in 2006 re-located from a side street to a prestigious building on the 
Rond Point Schuman, right next to the Commission’s renovated Berlaymont 
headquarters, and a location from which they can drape their Welsh Dragon flag 
across the roundabout from the Scottish Saltire which decorates Scotland House. 
However, it was with the opening of the grand new Bavarian representation, in a 
renovated palace sandwiched between the Committee of the Regions and the 
European Parliament building, that set a new precedent amongst regional 
representations in Brussels (Moore, 2006b). 
 
This expansionist tendency is also in evidence amongst the regional representations 
from the new member states. In the early phase of development, from 1999 when the 
first accession state regional office was opened by a Polish delegation, the tendency 
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representations in Brussels. These effectively saw office space ‘donated’ to partner 
regions in the acceding and new member states, who paid only for their own staff 
costs and facilities. Already, however, this initial grounding phase has given way to 
an era of upgrading amongst new member state regions. For instance, the Liberec 
region of the Czech Republic initially co-located in an office rented from Scotland 
Europa in Brussels, but has since established an independent office. The Polish capital 
region of Masovia in 2006 bought new premises in Brussels near to the Commission’s 
Headquarters, and on moving in, increased its staffing levels from one person to three 
full time members of staff, along with interns. The overall trend, therefore, is upward, 
towards a larger regional presence in Brussels.  
 
Table 1: Sample resources of regional representations in Brussels 
 
Regional Representation  Members of staff  Annual Budget (Euros, 2006) 
Central Bohemia (CZ)  3  250 000 
Pilsen (CZ)  1  180 000 
Lower Silesia (PL)  1  120 000 
Wielkopolska (PL)  3  125 000 
West Midlands (UK)  13  1 604 535 
Bavaria (D)  13  n/a 
 
It is a truism that no rational actor will ever waste resources by investing in an 
operation that does not deliver any form of a return. The representative offices of 
regions in the EU are controlled by a broad array of subscribing partners in the home 
regions, all of whom dictate operational strategy and lines of accountability. 
Irrespective of the nature of governing arrangements in the domestic region, be they 
federal, decentralised, unitary or other, a few common features are determinable: 
 
•  Representations in Brussels operate according to a business plan that is 
determined in the home region, in consultation with the EU office leadership 
•  To a greater or lesser extent, the strategy implemented by the Brussels office is 
complementary to broader strategic policy objectives of the home 
administration(s), both with regard to Europe and sectoral concerns 
•  A reporting function will demand that regional offices account to the 
stakeholders for their action, and offer an overview of the achievements and 
deliverables secured by the office, normally on an annual basis. 
 
Whilst the actual shape and scope of operations and control processes vary widely, 
these basic principles go some way to ensuring value for money to the end users in the 
regions.  
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benefits, such as the creation of networks, shaping policy proposals and ideas at an 
early stage in the EU legislative process, or bringing school and citizen groups to 
European Parliament debates, few of which are measurable in financial terms alone. It 
is for this reason that quantitative analysis of inputs and outputs remains a highly 
unsatisfactory approach to explaining why regional representations continue to exist 
(Marks et al., 2002). Whilst measuring precisely their added value is necessarily an 
impossible undertaking (Jeffery, 1997), it can be assumed that regional offices are 
delivering value for money if they are fulfilling the objectives set for them by the 
sponsoring authorities; the effectiveness of regional offices in relation to their 
operation is probably best defined as “whether they really get what they want”. If 
those objectives are set only at a low level, then they may be more easily obtained 
than more ambitious goals (Heichlinger, 1999: 19). The objectives of regional 
representations necessarily vary in line with the characteristics of the end users who 
demand some form of return on investment from their EU office. Thus, an 
appreciation of the divergent stakeholders who run regional representations in 
Brussels is crucial in appreciating the full complexity of the regional lobby in the EU. 
 
From the perspective of public administration, the operation of a Brussels office 
delivers a return in terms of a trained European “cadre”, with expertise in European 
Union policies, institutions and funding mechanisms. If managed effectively, this 
expertise can be captured within domestic administrations to provide a degree of 
European capacity within the home region. 
 
However, a model of seconding staff from the home regions to Brussels to staff these 
representations on a rotating basis is in operation only in a few member states, though 
it is clearly an ideal model to which many aspire. The larger regional administrations, 
such as Bavaria, often send two and possibly even three officials from home 
ministries to work in the Brussels representation. It is rare that a Land ministry does 
not have anyone within the Brussels representation supplying it directly with EU 
intelligence. Experience in the Brussels office is regarded as a core experience for 
career civil servants in the Bavarian administration and is regarded as facilitating 
promotion on return. Something approaching this rotational secondment model has 
been adopted by the Devolved Administrations of the UK since their Brussels 
operations were established, with key policy staff seconded from the home ministries 
as a form of capacity building on Europe. 
 
However, it is primarily these larger regional administrations that have the resources 
to be able to facilitate secondment to the EU office and to capture the expertise of 
staff on their return. Offices representing regions with smaller administrations and 
fewer domestic constitutional resources, for instance in the new member states, where 
there is no clearly defined career structure within the regional administration, tend to 
rely on locally-hired staff with the appropriate language skills to staff their offices in 
Brussels. Whilst the heads of office have largely been secondments to date, no human 
resources policies are in place to reward the time spent in Brussels with promotion on 
their return to the home administration, nor to capture the expertise of any staff in the 
EU office. Staff turnover has been high in all but a handful of the regional offices 
representing territories in the new member states, and it is noticeable that the offices 
where staff have been retained for a period of time are considered to be more efficient 
and effective operations. These offices, notably that of Poland’s Wielkopolska region, 
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The extent to which that capacity and expertise on EU matters can be harnessed to the 
benefit of the home administration remains largely untested as yet, given the 
relatively short history of new member state regional offices, but in the absence of 
overarching human resources policies for the Brussels offices, question marks remain. 
 
A DIVERSIFICATION OF GOALS: THE PRACTICAL LIMITS TO A 
‘EUROPE OF THE REGIONS’  
 
We can begin to understand the paradoxical situation of increasing regional 
representation in the EU at a time when the “Europe of the Regions” idea has fallen 
out of favour, by unpacking firstly the real meaning of the concept of a “Europe of the 
Regions”. This was always a very malleable concept, used by different actors in 
pursuit of differing goals. Nonetheless, the one unifying factor inherent in its imagery 
of a Europe driven not simply by nation states was that it could be harnessed in 
pursuit of a regional agenda – greater political participation for regional actors on EU 
issues, both at the member state level and at the Brussels level. Ultimately, it was in 
finding solutions to satisfy the varying intensity of demands for regional access that 
the concept fell apart; the scope and extent of that access varies from one member 
state to another. No Europe-wide solution could be developed given the increasing 
diversity of regional actors in the EU. 
 
Indeed, despite the fact that the regional presence in Brussels continues to grow 
rapidly, it has failed to crystallise into a single powerful and coherent regional lobby 
due in large part to the sheer diversity of its make-up. The increasing diversification 
of this regional voice in Brussels can be attributed to three core developments: 
 
1.  Devolution and decentralisation across the EU’s member states have not 
resulted in anything approaching a single ‘Third Level’ of constitutional 
actors. Significant variations in policy competences are identifiable across 
even the strongest tier of actors below the national level, limiting the extent to 
which these actors can lobby jointly on policy issues in Brussels beyond the 
constitutional regions issue.  
2.  Where the constitutional regions movement has been most significant is in 
lobbying to differentiate constitutional regions from mere administrative 
regions, arguing forcefully in favour of powers in the EU which recognise 
their unique legal status. The mobilising factor has been dissatisfaction with 
existing channels of interest mediation. In addition to forming a powerful 
force in constitutional lobbying, on those policy areas where there is 
agreement, there is a clear preference for constitutional regions to form ad-hoc 
advocacy coalitions which consciously exclude weaker, non-constitutional 
regions from their membership. 
3.  Alongside the constitutional regions/administrative regions divide, a new fault 
line has emerged between regions from the EU15 and regions from the new 
member states. Regions from the new member states tend to be relatively new, 
administrative creations. Unlike many of the strong EU15 regions, these do 
not constitute historic or linguistic regions, as national governments sought 
consciously to cross-cut inter-ethnic, religious and linguistic cleavages within 
their states in their territorial restructuring programmes throughout the 1990s. 
In addition, as relatively young and weak actors in the domestic system, there 
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clear preference for day-to-day policy work in Brussels, notably drawing 
down EU funding. Thus far, it has been non-constitutional regions who have 
formed the strongest partnerships with this new set of regional actors in 
Brussels, particularly when this can support a broader advocacy coalition on a 
sectoral policy concern or facilitate an EU-funded project in their own region. 
The constitutional regions in Brussels have had limited contact to the new 
member state regional representations. 
 
This diversification amongst Europe’s regions manifests itself through the manner in 
which they choose to direct their Brussels representations. A diversification of 
strategic aims and priorities can be identified, as can a diversification of implementing 
strategies, that is, the actions taken to operationalise the objectives set by their 
governing bodies. Thus, in the EU today, there are multiple dimensions of regional 
representative activity, and it is worth considering each of these in turn. 
 
Constitutional regions in Brussels 
 
The constitutional regions in Brussels represent a unique subset of regional actors in 
the EU with a delegated set of legislative competences. The Spanish Autonomous 
Communities, the German and Austrian Länder, the Belgian provinces and the 
Devolved Administrations of the UK constitute a vocal group of powerful regions, 
who together press for greater recognition of their unique governmental status in 
Europe, and a more powerful say within European decision-making processes. For 
instance, the convention on the future of Europe acted as a galvanising force, with 
constitutional regions using this debate as a platform to press for change (Keating, 
2004: 201) 
 
This group of regions is happy to remain an exclusive club in Brussels. There is a 
strong preference to work with other constitutional regions on issues of policy interest 
in the EU, though there are national variations. The German Länder, for instance, are 
more willing to join coalitions of non-constitutional regions in pursuit of domestic 
policy goals than are the Devolved Administrations of the UK, for two reasons. 
Firstly, the UK’s constitutional regions are complemented in Brussels by non-
governmental actors who tend to cover the more broad policy issues and interests of 
stakeholder groups in the region, allowing the Devolved Administration 
representations the freedom to pursue the political interests of the Executive alone. 
This representative picture is generally not the case for other constitutional regions in 
Brussels. Secondly, the German Länder are more confident of their constitutional 
status, and as such, are less concerned to profile themselves exclusively within a club 
of constitutional regions. There is an awareness within Brussels networks of the 
strong constitutional resources and domestic political hitting power which the German 
Länder can bring to any advocacy coalition. The Devolved Administrations, by 
contrast, are relatively young institutions, and remain focused on raising their profile 
as constitutional regions in Brussels circles. “Often, people I speak to don’t even 
realise that Wales now has an elected regional government”, was one Welsh policy 
officer’s comment. 
 
Common to all of the constitutional regions’ representations in Brussels is a strong 
political dimension to their work. Their role is clearly defined through the European 
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agencies and their end users. These offices seek to carry out policy work for ministers, 
help to define future policy programmes and agendas, and arrange ministerial 
meetings and briefings with key EU decision-makers. Their institutional focus is 
largely directed in Brussels towards those institutions with the most authority, and 
where they themselves are keen to extend their influence: primarily to the Council of 
Ministers and the Permanent Representations of their member states. The 
constitutional regions are unique in that, unlike any other ‘regional’ representations in 
Brussels, they can facilitate and support the work of decision-making officials within 
the Council, under the legal arrangements of Article 203 of the EU Treaty, allowing 
regional ministers to take the negotiating lead, albeit with the support of the respective 
national government. Thus, maintaining good links to both the Council and the 
Permanent Representations are core political objectives of these regional 
representations’ work. The institutions of lesser importance to these offices are largely 
the European Parliament, whose officials take policy lines which may well conflict 
with that of their sponsoring governments, along with the Committee of the Regions 
and the Economic and Social Committee. Links to the Commission remain very 
important for these actors, but there is little sense of any privileged partnership over 
the linkages established between Commission actors and other types of regional 
representations. 
 
The representations of administrative regions in Brussels  
 
For administrative or ‘non-constitutional’ regional representations in Brussels, the 
strategic objectives and policy goals are less clear-cut. For these offices, strategy is 
determined through consultation with their sponsoring stakeholders, which can range 
from simply one small team within a domestic, regional administration, as is usually 
the case with new member state, administrative regional representations, to a broad 
range of regional partners, involving local government actors, education institutions, 
voluntary associations, business groups and even private companies, such as is the 
case for the Scandinavian regional representations and the English regional offices. 
The work plan for the Brussels office is therefore decided through discussions within 
some form of management board, with a lowest common denominator approach 
necessarily resulting from their negotiations. The constraints imposed by having such 
a diverse membership generally mean that common ground tends to cover the less 
‘political’ dimension of EU policy work, such as those issues which support the 
economic development agenda of the region as a whole, and those which foster 
collaboration with other regions, for exchange of ideas and best practice, the creation 
of business links and opportunities, as well as the submission of project proposals to 
EU funds. The focus of their work tends to be on EU funding opportunities and the 
funding programmes than on seeking to shape EU legislation. They monitor funding 
opportunities published by the Commission, raise awareness of these schemes 
amongst eligible actors within their regions, look to link such actors to potential 
partners in other EU regions through the networks they engage with in Brussels.  
 
The conduct of this type of direct funds-seeking is characteristic of the representations 
of administrative regions in Brussels. Direct funds seeking remains only a marginal 
activity of constitutional regions’ EU representations, and they do not provide any 
harnessing services to individual companies or organisations in the regions. 
Furthermore, whilst administrative regions tend to employ a dedicated EU funding 
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representations; as funds-harnessing processes are very resource intensive, they are 
increasingly being sidelined by the constitutional regions in favour of a stronger focus 
on policy. Constitutional regions have largely carved off responsibility for this type of 
activity to other regional bodies with a presence in Brussels, such as local government 
associations, city representations or companies. 
 
As membership organisations, this kind of regional representation ultimately has to 
meet stakeholder demands, and its strategy is driven by deliverables and targets. 
Generally, unlike most Constitutional Regions, administrative regions produce some 
form of publicly available annual report, which highlights expenditures, incomes and 
tangible outputs over the past year. The ethos of this activity is that found in most 
private sector organisations, with the Brussels office reporting back to shareholders on 
an annual basis. This approach is underpinned by the ongoing questions of “value for 
money” and “effectiveness” that are common to any client/service relationship, and as 
such, replicate the logic of collective action found within European lobbying 
organisations (Greenwood, 2003). 
 
The political dimension of these offices’ work is more low-key than that of the 
constitutional regions. They do seek to engage in policy networks which allow 
regional actors in Brussels to share experience and develop joint opinions to deliver to 
Commission consultations or directly to the relevant policy officials. Some of these 
groupings are quite formal in nature, meeting on a regular basis with rotating 
presidencies and regular contacts to the Commission, for instance; others remain more 
ad-hoc in nature and are short lived, generally over the lifecycle of an individual 
policy proposal. As a result, their primary interlocutors in Brussels tend to be officials 
within the European Commission, where they often find themselves pressing against 
an open door in response to the “demand pull” from the many DGs who seek their 
participation (Mazey and Richardson, 2001: 79). Links to the Committee of the 
Regions are also generally strong, given the favourable and receptive climate to their 
policy proposals within that institution. Relations with MEPs are variable, given the 
explicitly political nature of their work. 
 
The representations of regions from new member states 
 
A third cluster of strategic aims and priorities is identifiable amongst the 
representations of regions from the new member states in Brussels. At present, these 
form a separate subset of regional representations in the EU due to the fact that they 
share similar characteristics and are faced with similar sets of challenges in their 
work. Despite a limited degree of constitutional capacity, notably in Poland, the 
regions from the new member states do not further the cause of the ‘constitutional 
regions’ lobby in Brussels, and instead, represent a group of relatively new regional 
constructs with limited recognition amongst EU actors and a strong focus on an 
economic development agenda. 
 
Firstly, the EU representations of new member state regions are clearly identifiable by 
their size. By and large, they remain much smaller than those of their EU15 
counterparts. For the time being, the largest offices retain a staff of 4 policy officials, 
alongside interns – the Prague region – alongside Masovia and Wielkopolska, two 
Polish regions which both have 3 policy staff. The majority of offices, however, are 
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regions have chosen to locate their representations together, in one single “House of 
Slovak/Hungarian” regions, in an effort to pool resources, and there is a certain 
degree of support amongst Czech regions for also adopting this model; some Czech 
officials argue that with a national population size equivalent to that of Bavaria, the 
only way they can begin to approach the model of a huge and effective lobbying 
machine in the EU is if they join forces. 
 
Running a one-person operation in Brussels is widely agreed to be a sub-optimal 
solution. Any individual representative has conflicting demands on their time, and as 
a result, they are chronically limited in their ability to carry out any substantive 
activities. This lack of resources in Brussels generally stems from a lack of awareness 
within the home region as to what an EU office can deliver. With no clear business 
plan to guide operation at the EU level, it is very hard for a one-person office to be 
effective. 
 
Secondly, the EU representations of regions from the new member states have 
generally had to face criticisms within their home regions, from the press and from 
opposition parties, as to the value of such a representation. The question as to whether 
they are “worth the money” is something many of them have had to justify publicly 
within the home region. Euro-scepticism within the home region often leads 
management boards in the sending authority to take the short term view and demand 
tangible results from the office, at the expense of some of the ‘softer’ benefits which 
often only bear fruit after a long period of cultivation. This constant demand to justify 
their presence is an echo of the early situation faced by EU15 regions when they first 
opened representations in Brussels. Early criticisms did fade over time as the benefits 
to the region from having and EU presence became evident. This suggests that there is 
a developmental trajectory for regional representations, and that this constant demand 
to provide validation of their role will ebb in years to come. 
 
Thirdly, the buzzword amongst regional representations from the new member states 
is very much that of “promotion”. The challenges for these regions are different to 
those faced by many EU15 regions when they first opened representations in 
Brussels: there are simply many more lobbyists and regional actors competing for 
eartime in the EU institutions than ever before, so carving out a profile and a niche 
role is much more difficult than in the past. As relatively new administrative 
constructs, their names have low levels of recognition within EU circles: few people 
have any idea that West Pannon and Eszak-Alföld are regions in Hungary for 
instance, or where in Poland the Lubuskie region is, whereas they may well have an 
idea where the Salzburg region is or the Midi-Pyrénées region is situated. This in 
some senses justifies the model adopted by Slovak and Hungarian regions to co-locate 
in one building, though such collaboration has drawbacks in allowing regions to 
present an individual profile to Brussels circles. 
 
The primary focus of the activities conducted by representations of regions from the 
new member states is on securing funding for regional actors, and on establishing the 
kind of networks with EU actors such as Commission officials and other regions 
which will facilitate this ultimate objective. Regions from the new member states are 
directed by the EU affairs team of their regional administrations, who are themselves 
faced with constant demands to justify expenditure in Brussels. This necessarily 
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regions, such as Lubelskie, for instance, are accountable not to the Europe directorate 
of the domestic administration but to the Department of Promotion and Tourism. 
Actors based in Brussels do recognise the value of contributing to ongoing policy 
debates, but are hamstrung in their ability to do so both by limited means and by the 
reporting and accountability restraints in the home region which have an exclusively 
results-oriented focus.  
 
The intensity of the links established between the representations of regions from the 
new member states and other actors in Brussels reflects this unique set of challenges. 
The European Commission remains the primary focus of actions, and their 
engagement is welcomed on the part of Commission officials seeking to gather 
viewpoints from the full EU27. Relations with Permanent Representations of their 
member state are positive, having overcome initial difficulties and legal challenges. 
The Permanent Representations are keen to engage closely with the regional 
representations as part of a larger national voice in Brussels and to share 
responsibilities. Relations with other EU regions based in Brussels, particularly 
partner regions, are crucial to delivering successful results for their own region. The 
emphasis on ‘promotion’ also makes the Committee of the Regions a much more 
important interlocutor than for other subsets of regional actors in Brussels, given their 
propensity to run profile-raising events, such as the Open Days, and exhibitions. 
Relations between the offices from their own country do tend to vary, with smaller 
member states generally developing better models of co-operation than the larger 
member states. The Czechs for instance form a closely-knit group in Brussels where 
resources and intelligence is exchanged freely; the Poles tend not to have met all of 
the other Polish representatives, and in fact refer to them as “the competition”. Polish 
regions in Brussels regard access to intelligence and resources as prized elements of 
comparative advantage, much more than do their Czech counterparts. 
 
THE EMERGENT DIMENSION OF “REGIONAL REPRESENTATION” IN 
BRUSSELS: REGIONAL PARLIAMENTARY ENGAGEMENT 
 
One of the most notable and innovative developments in the picture of territorial 
interest representation in the EU since devolution has been the recent establishment of 
regional  parliamentary representations in Brussels, alongside those of regional 
executives, regional administrative actors and stakeholder-driven regional coalitions. 
This move illustrates the increasing diversification of the “Europe of the Regions” 
agenda in the EU today. 
 
During 2005, both the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales 
opened representative bureaux in Brussels, alongside the existing parliamentary 
representations of the region of Sicily and two of the Belgian provinces. Whilst 
neither British office claims to have a diplomatic role or function, the sheer presence 
of a regional legislature and assembly in Brussels, housed in offices alongside those 
of their executives, marks a qualitative new step in regional engagement in the EU. 
Both offices stress that their primary role encompasses two strands of activity. The 
first is as an add-on function to the existing members’ research services based within 
the home centres, the aim being to provide a dedicated research service on EU matters 
for the full spectrum of committee work in Edinburgh and Cardiff. The second is a 
representative function, which seeks to situate these parliamentary bodies within the 
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institutions in Brussels. 
 
It remains to be seen whether the representation of regional parliaments and 
assemblies across the EU becomes the model which other constitutional regions will 
seek to emulate. There are few signs at present to indicate that this will be the case; 
interpretations of the UK regional parliamentary representations instead suggest that 
their creation is most likely accountable to the pro-active stance of the young 
democratic institutions of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for 
Wales in exercising their EU competences.  
 
It is notable, however, that horizontal networks between regional parliamentary 
representations have rarely been established. A common set of legislative interests 
and policy preferences does not necessarily emerge between regional parliamentary 
representations in the EU. Rather, regional parliamentary representations are more 
likely to work with other interest groupings from their own region, simply because 
they represent the same constituencies and their interests and policy concerns are 
necessarily more closely aligned. In the one area where these bodies do share 
common concerns, legislative competencies in the EU at the regional level, a coalition 
has not yet been mobilized, and it is unlikely to do so in the absence of any specific 
initiative in this field around which such interests could coalesce.  
 
Nonetheless, the growing emphasis within debate on the future of European 
integration on the role of national parliaments, which has in itself catalysed the recent 
astonishing establishment of national parliamentary offices in the EU, growing from a 
mere two to 22 within the period 2003 – 2006, suggests a growing role for regional 
parliaments as well. A renewed focus on parliamentary scrutiny and accountability 
has concentrated attention onto the parliamentary dimension of EU integration and 
could well catalyse further mobilization of regional parliaments in Brussels. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: A EUROPE OF, WITH OR FOR REGIONS?  
 
The paradox of regional Europe is that whilst the “Europe of the Regions” concept 
fails to provide an accurate reflection of current power relationships within the EU, 
appropriate and effective engagement in the EU remains a fundamental objective of 
all regional actors across the EU27. The direct engagement of regions in EU matters 
is, however, differentiated and depends on the nature of the sponsoring agencies 
within each individual region. The reality of the “Europe of the Regions” is clearly 
much more complex and more nuanced than this tagline would suggest. 
 
The role of regions in the EU has not been further formalised beyond the high point of 
mid-1990s, when the CoR was established and the Article 203 of the EU Treaty 
provided for – limited – regional leadership within the Council of Ministers. This has 
been due largely to growing discrepancy between “regional” priorities, limited 
coherence in the group’s demands and the emergence of a distinct, constitutional 
regions agenda, as articulated, for instance, through the RegLeg group of EU regions 
with legislative competences. Even the limited advancements for regions presented 
under the terms of the Draft Constitutional Treaty would do little to consolidate any 
sense of “Third Level” engagement in the EU; equally, the Open Method of Co-
ordination also offers little scope for regional actors to develop key leadership roles. 
  13As a result, simply to equate the current situation to a Europe with  the Regions 
(Hooghe and Marks, 1996) fails to reflect the differentiation in the activities and the 
demands of an increasingly diverse set of ‘regional’ actors across the EU27. Regional 
co-operation in policy formulation and legislation drafting is variable both across type 
of region and across policy sector concerned. 
 
Empirical analysis shows how the scope of regions’ engagement in the EU has a 
largely pragmatic focus. It is strategically oriented activity, which seeks to deliver 
direct benefits to end users, and these vary between types of regions active in the EU 
sphere. This notion of a Europe for the regions is an idea recently championed by 
many of the offices representing non-constitutional regions in Brussels. This approach 
would emphasise the tangibles delivered to the regions as a result of direct, permanent 
representative activity in Brussels, such as the establishment of business links, joint 
projects, EU funding of visible schemes and developments in the local area or EU 
legislation which takes into consideration the specific circumstances of a particular 
region
2. Regardless of the long term prospects for a Europe of the Regions, there are 
clear incentives to be part of the long-term game in Brussels. 
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